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In contrast to the rather bland attitude that characterized the anniversary of the start of the war, Victory Day three years later was a considerable undertaking. Politically, this could be read as a strategy to shore up Kim Jong Un's leadership in the aftermath of his succession to power in December 2011. However, while this may account for some of the differences between the anniversaries in 2010 and 2013, the contrasting emphases on the official beginning and end points of the war run much deeper, having to do with North Korean characterizations of the war and its historicity. Since my 2011 visit to North Korea, I have wondered whether there might not be an additional logic-not so much conciliatory as modernist-to the way history is conceptualized in North Korea. Such reasoning could explain the facile jump from the division of the country in 1945 to the outbreak of all-out war in 1950. Rather than simply highlighting North Korea's divergent perspectives about the war, this article explores North Korea's conception of history, which renders its understanding of the war in disparate ways, with particular attention to the war museum and its related sites. Together, the sites become ceremonial spaces within the monumental landscape that incite visitors to experience a ritual pilgrimage, tracing a linear history from Kim Il Sung's anticolonial exploits against Japan to his anti-imperialist struggles against the United States. By attributing a teleological trajectory to the Korean War, whether in the form of American imperialist designs or Korean desires for national liberation and unification, the tragic costs of the war both past and present are sidelined and suppressed.
The remainder of this article is divided into two parts. The first part provides an analysis of the evolution of the North Korean museum devoted to the Korean War in terms of two key geopolitical turning points: the 1970s, with the end of the Vietnam War, and the 1990s, with the end of the Cold War. The second part offers a discussion of the events and episodes considered relevant in the North Korean historiography of the war, both in text and in exhibition form, that renders the account inherently modernist in its affirmation of human agency to "make history." I expand on the significance of this point in the concluding section. From the abiding emphasis on victory to the framing of the war as an anti-imperialist war, my concern with North Korea's war memorialization has less to do with historical accuracy (already explored by other scholars) and more to do with the consequences of certain narrative strategies. Tracing the history of North Korean war memorialization to global developments, I situate North Korean narratives of the Korean War broadly within modernist historiography, not as an exception but working in tandem with others, to produce modernist temporalities that forsake a proper reckoning of the past and present in the rush to claim victory.
Claims to Victory from the 1970s to the 1990s
Unlike the War Memorial of Korea in Seoul (see D. Kim in this volume), which places the Korean War within a longue durée of foreign invasions and national resistance to establish an "unbroken warrior tradition" going back to the Three Kingdoms period (Jager 2002, 393-394) , the focal point in North Korea is the Korean War, to which the Victorious Fatherland Liberation War Museum is dedicated. Opened on August 17, 1953, soon after the signing of the armistice, as a "Comprehensive Exhibit on the Korean People's Army" (Chosŏn inmingun chonghap chŏllamhoe), the museum underwent a major renovation and relocated to its current location on April 11, 1974. 6 A North Korean guidebook explains that it was at this time that the museum added "Victorious" to its name, whereas it had been previously called the Fatherland Liberation
War Museum (Hwang and Kim 1997, 47) . The timing of this change is highly suggestive. The museum was reborn in the early 1970s, just as the Vietnam War was drawing to a close in precisely the fashion that North Korea had envisioned for the Korean War. signatories to the Peace Accords on behalf of the Vietcong, declared that North Korea during the Korean War had been the "first in the world to deal a critical blow to U.S. imperialists," but that the Vietnamese had achieved a "historical victory" by signing the Peace Accords that politically and legally ended the war and restored peace to Vietnam. She hailed the agreement as a "great victory," not only for the Vietnamese people but also for Indochina (Laos and Cambodia) Vietnamese victory was considered a beacon of hope for the revolutionary peoples of the Third World and a sign of the efficacy of armed struggle against American imperialism, which seemed to prove that "no matter how small a country, it can ably defeat imperialist aggression if one believes in the strength of one's own people and fights courageously with weapons in hand."
American military defeat during the Korean War was credited with initiating the decline of American power, whose final destruction had now been expedited by the Vietnamese victory. As a result, Rodong Sinmun declared that the period of invasion and interference by imperialists looking down on the peoples of Asia was over. Some twenty thousand Korean workers, youth, students, and soldiers gathered in Pyongyang to celebrate the Vietnamese victory. (Lee 2013, 196 translated as "self-reliance") ideology the only legitimate creed, insistence on self-reliance in politics, defense, and the economy enabled the North to achieve higher standards of living without having to bow to foreign forces. By contrast, the South Korean government had to negotiate with the United States to prevent it from reducing its military commitment to the South in reaction to the Nixon Doctrine that called for the "Vietnamization of the Vietnam War" and demanded that Asian allies take up their own security. As if to declare its upper hand, the 1972
Socialist Constitution finally established Pyongyang as the capital of Korea, unlike previous constitutions, which had acknowledged Seoul as the historic capital (Schinz and Dege 1990, 27) . conclusion of the Vietnam War was the kind of ending Kim Il Sung had undoubtedly wished for the Korean War. Even without unification, however, the rebirth of the museum in the 1970s was intended to stake a claim to victory. Whereas the previous museum had been housed in a modest two-story building in the foothills of Haebang Hill, the new building-itself since replaced-was an imposing L-shaped structure with three floors and a basement (Kim Insik 1993) . 19 The total floor space of 52,000 square meters (or almost 13 acres) contained more than eighty showrooms in eighteen halls with more than sixty panoramic murals. The focal point of the museum was a massive 360-degree revolving panorama and diorama of the Taejŏn partners and many of its diplomatic allies overnight, leaving it isolated and insecure about its own future. The government redoubled its efforts to ideologically strengthen its society with a renewed commitment to guarding its legacy.
Rodong Sinmun hailed the war museum as a "great school that teaches the path to victory,"
reporting that some 15.4 million domestic visitors and 230,000 foreign visitors, including heads of state and government delegations, had visited the museum over the course of its forty-year Sinmun opined that the monument was distinctive from monuments in other countries for its representation of "the belief and commitment of the new generation to follow the path of Juche and follow the party's leadership" rather than simply dwelling on the past. 23 In trying to distinguish its own monuments as serving the present interests of the people (rather than the dead elite of the past), the party organ confirmed that the past is really about the present, aligning its conception of history with modernist interpretations.
A Convergence of Histories from East to West
Indubitably, the function of monuments and museums is to summon the past to serve the present. It is no surprise, then, that the war museum in Pyongyang employs a variety of strategies to present the past, ranging from reenactments of specific battle scenes (such as the cyclorama of the Taejŏn Battle) to displays of archival documents, photos, and wartime newsreel footage. Despite the brutality of war and the continued division of the peninsula, the war museum presents the armistice agreement signed on July 27, 1953 , as a victory for the North, because this was the first time the United States had signed an armistice without a clear victory. Indeed, the site of the armistice signing, P'anmunjŏm, visually affirms North Korea's view of the Korean War. The two parties that signed the armistice are denoted by the North Korean flag and the flag of the United Nations (figures 5, 6, and 7). In describing P'anmunjŏm as the location where Korea was artificially divided by the Americans in 1945, North Korea charges U.S. imperialists with starting a war of aggression "in order to swallow up the whole of Korea," whereas the same place becomes a "venue of north-south dialogues and contacts" for Koreans from both sides ("Panmunjom" n.d.). In this way, the Korean War ceases to be a civil war; instead, it is an imperialist war of aggression that was successfully repelled by North Korea. The Korean people are painted as a "homogeneous nation who have lived harmoniously in one and the same territory," erasing the divisions in the aftermath of colonial rule. Those who joined forces with the Americans during the war are labeled "puppets" and "cannon fodder," stripping them of any autonomy and duplicating the way in which the North has been construed as a Soviet puppet by the South. The three sites of division, war, and massacre point to one conclusion: the need to repel, at whatever cost, any further American threat. This visual discourse is backed up by archival evidence exhibited throughout the museums.
The most damning piece of evidence used repeatedly by the museums and publications to prove that the Americans initiated hostilities is the correspondence between Syngman Rhee and his American advisor, Robert T. Oliver. In a letter dated September 30, 1949, Rhee implores Oliver to consider working for him, relaying his "strong" feeling that "now is the most psychological moment when we should take an aggressive measure" (figure 8). To this, Oliver responds on October 10, 1949, that "we should continue to lean way over backward to avoid any semblance of aggression, and make sure the blame for what happens is upon Russia" (figure 9).
What is not highlighted in the documents displayed is Oliver's acknowledgment that "to suggest an attack across the 38º would…be disastrous." The potential ambiguity of these letters is thus However, in a glossy English-language pictorial book about the Korean People's Army published in 1993 and devoted almost entirely to the Korean War, there is one passing indication that the war was in fact a civil war of "a bitter class struggle against the enemies of the people" (Kim, In Il 1993, 14) . But even here, Americans are held responsible for providing U.S.$110 million in military aid, building military airfields, and concentrating the South Korean troops along the 38th parallel. Thus, the book concludes, it was the "south Korean puppet clique… [that] started the criminal armed invasion of the northern half of the country at the instigation of the U.S. imperialists" (Kim, In Il 1993, 16) . Setting aside the question of who "invaded" whom, North Korean accounts do not explain how the so-called defensive war turned into an all-out offensive war. Simply stated, Kim Il Sung organized a "decisive counterattack," calling for "allout victory" in the war for reunification of the country during his national radio address the day after the outbreak of war. This successful counterattack then led to "the liberation of 90 percent of southern territory and 92 percent of the southern population" as a "miraculous feat unknown in the thousands of years of war history" and only possible with "the leader's undefeatable military strategy." 28 This is one indication of the muddled beginnings of a civil war, despite the North's reluctance to call it that.
Displacing the civil origins of the war, the basic assumption undergirding North Korean narratives is that the Korean War was the first step in American designs for world hegemony (Kim H. 2004 ). Pointing to President Roosevelt's suggestion for a forty-year trusteeship over Korea as early as 1943, the United States is accused of having long coveted Korea for its geographic location and its ports and rails stretching into Northeast Asia and the Soviet Union, with the potential to reach Europe. Toward that end, the United States maintained and revived the fascist colonial apparatus in Korea after the Asia-Pacific War, reinstating pro-Japanese collaborators. The division of the peninsula is thus regarded as a premeditated plan to occupy the southern half of Korea "without spilling a single drop of blood," in contrast to the Soviet occupation of the North, which had begun in early August 1945 battling the Japanese.
Ironically, this perspective is bolstered in inverted form by the original American understanding of the war as an international conflict, but in this case waged to counter Soviet expansionism. 29 In this framing, to call the Korean War a civil war is "misleading," because "the war included combatants representing twenty different governments," with "fifty to sixty percent efforts at talks between the leaders of the North and South in April 1948-there could have been a breakthrough that did not leave Korea on a war footing. Conversely, there is no certainty that without division, there would have been no war. But modernist historiography demands clear causal connections aided and abetted by the "musealization" of experience, whereby the museum emerges as "the paradigmatic institution that collects, salvages, and preserves," in order to reconstruct the past in terms of the present (Huyssen 1995, 14-15) . Here there are no ambiguities, what-ifs, or uncertainties with blurred outcomes-only the end result: the residual artifact illuminated under the viewing box, neatly categorized and contained and lacking any of the complexities of actual events.
Modernist Temporalities and Tragic Ends
In The vessel is still listed as commissioned by the U.S. Navy and is the only American ship held by a foreign country. 31 The large weaponry, tanks, and aircraft that were previously displayed in the basement of the museum, including those captured from the Americans during the Korean War, have been moved outside on either side of the main building to complement the Pueblo.
In sync with the construction boom observed throughout Pyongyang in recent years, the museum's gallery hall received a complete makeover as well as a new structure, featuring gilded decorations and an updated design to the interior exhibition space, built right behind the Victory statue. As shown in an aerial image of the site, the new building is connected directly to the monument, in contrast to the gallery's previous location across the river (figure 11). The spatial reconfiguration that binds the museum and the monument as a single site is a visual manifestation of the taut relationship between the history of the war and its claim to victory.
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Victory is affirmed by spatially connecting the museum to the monument, and yet the very resources that had to be expended to link the two structures expose the spatial stretch that was made to relocate the museum, thereby (re)situating the war as victorious. At each step-from the first relocation of the modestly sized building tucked away in the foothills to the more prominent 1974 structure, and then the second relocation that tied the 2013 museum closer to the 1993 monument-the museum's relocations constitute a spatial fix for the ambiguities of the war. In the gap between the old and new museums lie the uncertain configurations in the narrative of the war, filled with tension and anxiety about its (un)ending. The spatial link aims to compensate for the temporal gaps in history, whether those gaps are the complexities in the years leading up to the war or those in the years since its unresolved aftermath. As geographer Edward Soja has argued, "space can be made to hide consequences from us" (1989, 6) . Despite North Korea's insistence on an emancipatory modernist historiography of people "making history," as reflected in its triumphalist narrative of the war, it is the unacknowledged tragedies and the limits to modernist temporalities that have displaced the temporal logic and its narrative uncertainties with the spatial logic that visually appears immutable due to its materiality. 33 His actions were as sublime as that of a "mother who sacrifices herself to confront a beast of prey in order to save her child" (Kim H. 2004, 167) . 34 This perception of history as being made through the strength of resolve in the exercise of self-determination leaves no room for human failures, historical contingencies, or unintended consequences. How can a war as devastating as the Korean War not be the result of premeditated foreign ambitions when North Korean political ideology relies on the principle of self-determination-that is, the ability and responsibility of human beings to shape and mold the course of history? Without the war's official end and a proper reckoning of accountability on all sides, trauma festers into resentment as a reminder of unsettled pasts (Brudholm 2008) . In North Korea, the Korean War is relived continually, not just through museums and memorial sites, but also through the constant reminder of continued conflict with the United States.
The restoration of transformative politics requires an acknowledgment of the past. Korean War (see Hong in this volume), suggests that the United States has yet to fully acknowledge its own mistakes. 36 Needless to say, neither has North Korea. This is not to point fingers at North Korea, but to underscore its inability to confront the past. Anthropologist David Scott poignantly notes that certain "histories tend not to inquire systematically into the ways in which the expectation of-or longing for-particular futures helps to shape the kind of problem the past is constructed as for the present" (2004, 31) Tragedy has a more respectful attitude to the past, to the often-cruel permanence of its impress: it honors, however reluctantly, the obligations the past imposes. Perhaps part of the value of the story-form of tragedy for our present, then, is not merely that it raises a profound challenge to the hubris of the revolutionary (and modernist) longing for total revolution, but that it does so in a way that reopens a path to formulating a criticism of the present. (2004, 135) In other words, it is by letting go of the claim to victory and accepting the possibility of tragic ends that we can fully acknowledge past mistakes and take stock of present problems. The responsibility of doing so falls on everyone involved, but perhaps more heavily on those who 
Notes

1
Socialist cities are not exposed to the kinds of pressures found in capitalist cities, which must weigh the benefits of generating revenue from taxation on private real estate against public spending. As a result, Socialist cities tend to devote large amounts of public space to parks, squares, and infrastructure based on central planning that highlight the city as a symbol of the Socialist collective: as a "city of production," a "city of green," and a "city of symbolism" (Im 2011). The last function is especially pronounced and different from the capitalist city since large public squares are used for mass political gatherings rather than as marketplaces or religious sites. See Im (2011, (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (88) (89) Hall (1978) . The subway lines in Pyongyang also began operation during this period. See Hwang and Kim (1997) and Im (2011, 143-149 
